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banditry, criminality, and interethnic
violence must be altered, by force if
necessary, if Western governments and
organizations expect to make failed,
war-torn states into bona fide members
of the international community.
One only wishes that this little gem of a
book had been published earlier.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College
Loveman, Brian, ed. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Secu-
rity Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region.
New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 367pp.
$27.95
It does not take exceptional analytical
talent to recognize that U.S. policies in
the Andean region of South America
face severe challenges, especially those
dealing with the war on drugs. Neither
does it take an exceptional historian to
recognize that the United States has all
too often paid insufficient attention to
its regional neighbors and partners.
Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery
of international relations to recognize
that South America is becoming in-
creasingly important to the safety, well-
being, and future prosperity of the
United States. For all these reasons, a
clear explanation of U.S. policies in the
region and evaluation of those policies’
track records and potential future con-
sequences are especially welcome.
To a degree, and despite a somewhat
incendiary title, Addicted to Failure pro-
vides a portion of the needed under-
standing. Its editor asked a rather
impressively credentialed group of ana-
lysts to examine each of the countries in
the Andean region and the role that
U.S. policy has had in shaping those
states’ political futures. These analyses
follow Brian Loveman’s own overview
of U.S. policies in the entire region. A
chapter devoted to the European Union’s
efforts follows a state-by-state review,
and the book concludes with an exami-
nation of a possible preemptive U.S.
intervention in Colombia on the scale
of operations currently being con-
ducted in Iraq.
However, this volume is not a resound-
ing success. Loveman’s introductory
chapter is a case in point. His basic ar-
gument seems to be that U.S. policy,
whether crafted by Republican or Dem-
ocratic presidents, formed during or after
the Cold War, altruistic or operational
in nature, intentional or accidental, has
been consistently wrong. U.S. policy,
Loveman argues, has for decades made
matters worse for Andean states. There
are two problems here. First, Loveman’s
disdain for past and present U.S. actions
actually begins to obstruct and detract
from his central argument. Readers ex-
pecting to find a more academic and
objective analysis may question the ob-
jectivity of the author at the expense of
the merit of his argument. The second
problem is even more serious. Loveman
seeks to prove his contention with offi-
cial U.S. reports and documents, but
the quotations are highly selective and
all too often presented without context.
Indeed, had an equally passionate voice
argued the distaff side of Loveman’s ar-
gument, this would have been a most
interesting volume.
Luckily, the next six chapters are differ-
ent. Authored by well known and re-
spected scholars, they draw a compelling
picture of U.S. policy in the Andean re-
gion. Although all are worthy, Orlando
Perez’s evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan
policy and Enrique Obando’s analysis
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of Peruvian-U.S. relations are the high
points of the book. Obando does an es-
pecially fine job reviewing the successes
and eventual failures of U.S. antidrug
policies.
Addicted to Failure effectively raises sev-
eral significant issues for the reader to
mull over. Has the U.S. counterdrug
policy been a costly failure that has made
the rise of populist leaders such as Hugo
Chavez and Ernesto Morales easier?
Does the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucion-
arias de Colombia (FARC) pose threats
to the United States beyond those asso-
ciated with drug trafficking? If the cur-
rent policies are counterproductive,
what are the correct policies? Loveman
does not provide convincing answers to
the first two questions and does not ad-
dress the third.
At the end of the day, Addicted to Fail-
ure is a book that should not be disre-
garded. It encourages readers to plunge
deeper into the complexities of South
America. For while Loveman and his
authors may not offer any answers, it is
clear that the United States will face in-
creasingly complex challenges from this
part of the world in the years ahead.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College
Taylor, Lewis. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in
Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980–1997. Liverpool,
U.K.: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2006. 232pp. $32.50
In Shining Path Lewis Taylor provides
compelling evidence that the attitude of
the people can be decisive in war. That
point will not surprise students of war-
fare; they will recall that two great strat-
egists stressed the central importance of
having the people on your side. Focusing
primarily on state-to-state conflict, Carl
von Clausewitz coined the notion that
war’s dominant tendencies make a
“paradoxical trinity,” of which one pole
comprises primordial violence, hatred,
and enmity, a blind natural force. The
passions, Clausewitz wrote, “that are to
be kindled in war must already be in-
herent in the people.” Concentrating on
guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung fa-
mously wrote that “in the relationship
that should exist between the people
and the troops, the former may be lik-
ened to water and the latter to the fish
that inhabit it.”
In the Peruvian case, repeated failure to
understand and respect the rural popu-
lation on the parts of the guerrillas (the
Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”)
led by Abimael Guzmán and of the gov-
ernment of Peru came close to dooming
the efforts of both sides in the bloody
conflict. After the end of hostilities, a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
concluded that more than sixty-nine
thousand Peruvians had been killed in
the fighting, with Maoist rebels of the
Shining Path responsible for the major-
ity of deaths. Both Clausewitz and Mao
made clear that the end of warfare was
not destruction but policy. Lewis Taylor
shows how close the combatants came,
through their own excesses, to defeating
their own causes.
Regrettably, Taylor, a lecturer in Latin
American sociology at the University of
Liverpool, does not adequately high-
light the strategic implications of his
subject. In fact, reading his book leaves
unanswered the questions of why he
wrote it and for whom. Taylor focuses
his study narrowly on the northern
highlands of Peru, which were a partic-
ularly brutal locus of armed action. Al-
though he acknowledges that generalized
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